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teriality or fraud would in that case serve as grounds for avoidance whether the statement were a warranty or a representation. This interpretation is supported by the language of the
second sentence of Article 619 (B), not found in earlier, similar
Louisiana statutes. Such an interpretation would impose the
hardship on the insured of allowing the insurer additional
grounds for the avoidance of the contract; but the purpose of
enacting such a statute is to relax the common law rule.9 The
correct interpretation therefore seems to be that an immaterial
misrepresentation, although fraudulent, does not give the insurer
the privilege of avoiding the contract.
In the instant case, the insurance company's "practically
admitting the absence of fraud" left to be decided only the
question of whether or not the insured's statements concerning
medical treatment for a heart disease were material. The finding that the insured's false statements were material seems consistent with the Louisiana jurisprudence on that subject; 0 a
finding that a false statement is material would seem to give the
insurer the privilege of avoiding the contract whether the statement be fraudulent or not.'
Maynard E. Cush

LOUISIANA PRACTICE-APPLICATION FOR SUPERVISORY
WRITS-EFFECT ON TRIAL COURT PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff, seeking review of a ruling made by the trial judge
during the course of the trial, invoked the supervisory jurisdicthat the fraud complained of had injuriously affected the insurer." VANCE
INSURANCE 388 (3d ed. 1951).
9. Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Stalling, 110 Tenn. 1, 72 S.W. 960 (1903);
Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics' Savings Bank & Trust Co., 73 Fed.
653 (6th Cir. 1896); APPLEMAN, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE § 7253 (1943).
10. In Lee v. New York Life Ins. Co., 144 La. 445, 80 So. 652 (1919) (insured
consulted doctor for a minor ailment and the doctor found on examination

the patient had Bright's disease) and Jefferson Standard Life Ins. Co. v.
Stevenson, 70 F.2d 72 (5th Cir. 1934)

(major lung disease),

,.oncealment of

the consultation was held to be material although the seriousness of the
disease had been concealed from the insured.

The

insured

made

statements

about

receiving

medical

treatment

for the ailments indicated: Mataya v. Delta Life Ins. Co., 71 So.2d 139 (La.
App. 1954) (common cold); Carroll v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 168 La. 953, 123
So. 638 (1929) (indigestion); Cunningham v. Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., 152 La.
1023, 95 So. 110 (1922) (nongonorrheal prostatitis); Goff v. Mutual Life Ins.
Co., 131 La. 98, 59 So. 28 (1912) (malaria); Cole v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 129

La. 704, 56 So. 645 (1911) (minor throat ailment). In all these cases the statements were held immaterial.
11. See Rhodes v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 172 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1949).
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tion of the Supreme Court. The trial judge, interpreting the
recent decision of State ex rel. Marston v. Marston1 as leaving
him no discretion to proceed with the trial, stayed proceedings
pending action on the application for supervisory writs. Held,
it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge whether trial
proceedings should be stayed after notification that a litigant
intends to seek review of an adverse ruling under the supervisory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Roumain v. Moody,
225 La. 187, 72 So.2d 473 (1954).
In State ex rel. Marston v. Marston, the defendant's exception of lis pendens was overruled by the trial judge. Thereupon
the defendant notified the trial judge that she would apply to
the Supreme Court for a review of the ruling. The trial judge
did not stay proceedings, default judgment was rendered in
favor of the plaintiff, and defendant's motion to vacate the judgment was denied. On application for supplemental supervisory
writs the Supreme Court held that the notification of intent to
apply for supervisory writs served to stay proceedings and therefore the trial judge was powerless to proceed with the case
pending action on the application. A note on the Marston decision 2 takes the position that the decision cannot be reconciled
with prior jurisprudence to the effect that trial court proceedings are suspended only if alternative writs are granted by the
Supreme Court together with a stay order served on the trial
judge.3 The note also points out that the Marston rule might
be employed for purely dilatory purposes. If trial judges were
forced to stay proceedings upon nothing more than a notification
of intent to apply for writs, they would be unable to prevent
vexatious delays resulting from frivolous applications.
In a per curiam opinion, the court in the instant case stated
that "any language to be found in the Marston case to the contrary notwithstanding, in the trial of all cases, whether civil or
criminal, it is within the sound discretion of the trial judge to
determine whether or not the proceedings during the course
of a trial being had before him should be stayed while the
litigant complaining of an adverse ruling seeks writs to this
court, and that it is also within the sound discretion of the trial
judge to determine and fix the time within which such applica1. 223 La. 1046, 67 So.2d 587 (1953).

2. Note, 14 LOUISIANA LAW REVIow 708 (1954).
3. First National Bank Bldg. Co. v. Dickson & Denny, 202 La. 970, 13
So.2d 283 (1943); Arthur v. Dupuy, 130 La. 782, 58 So. 570 (1912).
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tion should be made, and that it is only when there has been
a clear abuse of that discretion that this court will interfere,
and, even then, only when it is shown that the abuse of that
discretion will result in irreparable injury to the complaining
party."'4 The Supreme Court's failure to overrule specifically
the Marston case raises questions as to its use in the future.
The Marston and Roumain cases may be distinguished in two
important respects. First, as the opinion in the Roumain case
states, the plaintiff had on two occasions caused a stay of trial
proceedings by applying for supervisory writs. The employment
of purely dilatory tactics was obvious. Second, the Marston
case involved a ruling made by the trial judge before trial,
whereas in the Roumain case the ruling was made during the
the trial. It is submitted that the holding of the Roumain case
should not be restricted to its peculiar facts, but should be
interpreted so as to prevent the use of the Marston rule for
delaying the proceedings, either before or after commencement
of trial. The trial judge is in the best position to control the
proceedings in his court and his discretion should be left unfettered unless clearly abused.
Neilson Jacobs
MINERAL RIGHTS-REVERSIONARY INTEREST
Plaintiffs appealed from a judgment dismissing their suit to
be recognized as owners of a one-fourth mineral interest to
which they had purchased the right of reversion. Plaintiffs'
vendor had purchased the surface of the land concerned subject
to an outstanding one-fourth mineral servitude; he then sold the
land, plus a one-half interest in the minerals, to the defendant,
reserving in the act of sale a present one-fourth mineral interest
and the right of reversion to the outstanding servitude. The
act of sale contained the stipulation that the right of reversion
should prescribe at the same time as the one-fourth mineral
interest reserved with it. Plaintiffs alleged that prescription had
run against the outstanding servitude, causing it to vest in them
as purchasers of the right of reversion. Defendants argued that
it reverted to the land which they now own. Held, the reservation of the reversionary interest was an attempt to circumvent
the public policy of the state that mineral rights should revert
4. 72 So.2d 473 (1954).

